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The Right to Counsel in Special Courts-Martial
The United States Court of Military Appeals recently
held that the constitutional right to counsel applies to
accused servicemen prosecuted before special courts-
martial. At the same time, however, the court indicated
that nonlawyer officers may properly be appointed coun-
sel in such cases. The author of this Note considers the
arguments for and against retention of nonlawyer coun-
sel and concludes that the importance of providing
competent counsel overrides all of the objections com-
monly raised to any proposed elimination of the present
system.
[N]o man should take up arms, but with a view to defend his coun-
try and its laws: he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp;
but it is because he is a citizen, and would wish to continue so, that he
makes himself for a while a soldier.'
INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment to the federal constitution provides that
"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." This
guarantee was interpreted in Powell v. Alabama2 to require the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in all capital
cases, and was expanded in Johnson v. Zerbsts to afford the
assistance of counsel in all federal felony prosecutions. Recently,
in Gideon v. Wainwright,4 the Supreme Court further held that
refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent in certain state criminal
prosecutions constitutes a denial of fourteenth amendment due
process. After Gideon, therefore, representation by counsel is
deemed essential to a fair trial in both federal and state criminal
proceedings, at least where the offense charged is of a serious
nature.
In Powell the Court implicitly recognized that the right to
effective counsel is a necessary corollary to the requirements of
the sixth amendment.5 Effective counsel has been defined as one
who is skilled in the science of the law, is familiar with the rules
of evidence, and is otherwise capable of properly conducting the
1. BLACKSTONE, COAMENTARIES *408.
2. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
3. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. 287 U.S. at 56, 58.
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defense of an accused Gideon implies that right to counsel
denotes representation by a trained lawyer;7 moreover numerous
federal and state decisions have expressly recognized that the
term "counsel" as used in the sixth amendment refers to a mem-
ber of the bar.8
Military tribunals, unlike their civilian counterparts, are com-
pletely regulated by a statutory code adopted in 1950 - the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) . Under the UCMJ
a serviceman accused of a violation of military law may be tried
before a general, a special, or a summary court-martial.0
The "summary court-martial"" tries only petty offenses and
is therefore substantially comparable to the civilian police or
magistrate's court. The question of right to counsel in a summary
court-martial, however, is beyond the scope of this Note since
it has not yet been determined whether Gideon applies to those
civilian inferior courts which deal only with minor offenses. 2
Furthermore the use of the summary court is rapidly declining
as a result of recent expansion in the power of commanding
6. Id. at 69.
7. 372 U.S. at 344.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963); United
States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949); People v. Agnew,
114 Cal. App. 2d 841, 250 P.2d 369 (1952); People v. Cox, 12 III. 2d 265,
146 N.W.2d 19 (1957); Higgins v. Parker, 854 Mo. 888, 191 S.W.2d 668
(1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 801 (1946).
9. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964). The UCMJ was enacted after World
War I1 as a result of citizen protests against the abuses inherent in the prior
court-martial system. Such abuses included harsh sentences, wide discrepancies
in sentence for the same offense, and increases in sentences on appeal. White,
The Background and the Problem, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 197, 200 (1961).
For a statement of the major rights and remedies provided in the UCMJ,
see Snedeker, The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 38 GEo. L.J. 521 (1950).
10. On the mechanics of all three military tribunals see generally U.S.
Ant FoncE ROTC, Tnn MILITARY JusTicE SYSTEm (rev. ed. 1962).
11. In the summary court-martial proceedings a single officer, frequently
a nonlawyer, serves as judge, jury, prosecuting attorney, and defense counsel.
The maximum sentences this court may impose are confinement at hard
labor for one month, reduction in rate, restriction for two months, forfeiture
of two-thirds pay for one month, and certain limited combinations of these
punishments. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964) (UCMJ art. 20). For a good description
of summary court-martial proceedings see Douglass, One-Man Court, JAG
J., Jan. 1954, p. 7.
12. An excellent discussion of the difficulties involved in determining
which offenses warrant the appointment of counsel may be found in Kamisar
& <Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and
Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MiNw. L. Rnv. 1, 62-88 (1963).
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officers to impose nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of the
UCMJ.13
The general court-martial is the military court of general
jurisdiction and deals with the most serious military offenses;
it is the only court with power to impose such sentences as a
dishonorable discharge or confinement for a period over six
months.14 Prior to adoption of the UCMJ, officers with no formal
legal training were frequently employed as counsel in general
courts-martial.:5 The draftsmen of the Code, however, recognized
that inadequate representation of an accused before courts-
martial constituted one of the most serious abuses in the system
of military justice,"" and therefore required in article 27 that an
13. See 1963 U.S. COURT OF MmrrAY APpFn.s ANN. RF. 1, 61; Schrader,
The Military Trial Judge, 53 Ky. L.J. 135 (1964). Article 15 punishment is
not considered a conviction and has no connection with the military courts-
martial system. Moreover, the effect of such punishment is transitory in that
all record of it is destroyed when the offending serviceman is permanently
transferred to another duty station or is discharged from the armed forces.
Penalties imposed under article 15 include "restriction to limits" for up to
60 days, forfeiture of pay for up to three months, and/or reduction of rate.
See generally Kiechel, Nonjudicial Punishment, JAG Bulletin, Jan.-Feb.
1963, p. 16; Kuhfeld, Amendments to Article 15, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, Judge Advocate J., Bulletin No. 34, Oct. 1962, p. 69; Leonhaxdt,
Nonjudicial Punishment Under the New Article 15-An Explanation, 17
JAG J. 25 (1963).
Despite its increasing obsolescence the summary court-martial should be
abolished because, albeit the sentences imposed by it are minor, the con-
victions stigmatize a serviceman with the permanent taint of "court-martial"
without affording him a fair trial. Furthermore, case studies have indicated
that many servicemen develop a low opinion of the quality of military justice
because of abuses in summary courts-martial. See Creech, Congress Looks
to the Serviceman's Rights, 49 A.B.A.J. 1070, 1079, (1963); 109 CONG. REC.
14148 (1963); cf. Douglass, supra note 11. Legislation is currently pending
to abolish summary proceedings. See S. 759, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
This legislation has considerable support. See 1963 U.S. COURT OF MITARY
APPEALS Amx. REP.; Creech, supra; Ervin, The Congressional Study on the
Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, Judge Advocate J., Bulletin No.
35, June 1963, p. 4, at 9; Neff, Right to Counsel in Special Courts-Martial,
Judge Advocate J., Bulletin No. 34, Oct. 1962, p. 58, at 67; Schrader, supra
at 137. But see Legislature Comm. of the Judge Advocates Association,
Report, Judge Advocate J., Bulletin No. 37, June 1964, p. 18, at 19.
14. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-20 (1964) (UCMJ arts. 18-20).
15. United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 609, 26 C.M.R.
387, 389 (1958); Snedeker, supra note 9, at 526.
16. See Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on the Armed Services,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 623 (1949); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2264-65
(1950).
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accused be represented by professional counsel in general courts-
martial. As a result the proceedings of a general court-martial
now closely parallel those of a civilian criminal court. The Law
Officer, a military lawyer, fulfills the function of an impartial
judge in ruling on points of procedural and substantive law; the
members of the court determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused in much the same manner as a civilian jury; and the
trial and defense counsel, both trained lawyers, correspond to the
prosecutor and defense attorney. Such trials clearly meet the
standard of procedural due process prescribed in Gideon.
Special court-martial proceedings, however, are not subject
to the procedural safeguards of the general court-martial. Such
trials are not conducted in the presence of a Law Officer. Rather,
the President of the court, who is its senior officer, fulfills the
trial-judge function. In addition, the UICMJ does not require
the appointment of lawyers as trial and defense counsel in special
courts-martial, and nonprofessionals frequently serve in these
capacities.17 Nevertheless, this tribunal may impose penalties
such as a bad-conduct discharge, confinement at hard labor for
a maximum period of six months, reduction in rate, forfeiture
of pay for a maximum period of six months, or any combination
thereof.'8
The purpose of this Note is to consider whether the use of
appointed nonprofessional counsel in the special court-martial
trial is per se a violation of the right to counsel established by
Gideon and its forerunners. Consideration will be given to
whether the sixth amendment is applicable to military courts
and, if it is, whether it is satisfied by the appointment of non-
professional counsel to perform functions in the military which
are restricted to professionals in the civilian legal system. Finally,
there will be a discussion of the remedies available to a service-
man who believes that he has been wrongfully denied counsel
and of the means best calculated to effectuate the right to counsel
for all servicemen.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT "RIGHT TO COUNSEL"
AND MILITARY DUE PROCESS
A dichotomy has traditionally existed between the require-
ments of due process applicable to the civilian and military legal
17. See Neff, supra note 18, at 62.
18. See 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964) (UCVMJ art. 19). It should be noted,
however, that both the Army and the Air Force require professional counsel
in any case which may warrant a punitive discharge. See text accompanying
note 61, infra.
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systems. This arose from a tendency to regard military law as a
separate area of jurisprudence subject to no external control; thus
it was said by the Supreme Court that "[t]o those in the military
... the military law is due process."' 9 Since the adoption of the
UC1[J the Court of Military Appeals has dominated the de-
velopment of military due process. This court consists of three
civilian members and functions as the military counterpart of the
United States Supreme Court. 0 Like the Supreme Court, the
Court of Military Appeals initially adhered to the traditional due
process dichotomy and held that the "source and strength" of
military due process was the UCMJ - therefore, the Code could
limit constitutional due process.&21
Those who support the dichotomy have argued that the pro-
visions of the UCMJ- constitute the standard of military due
process established by Congress under its exclusive power "To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces. 22 They conclude that since the UCMJ does not
explicitly require the appointment of legally-trained defense coun-
sel in special courts-martial such counsel are not necessary to sat-
isfy military due process.3 This traditionally rigid view of mili-
tary due process has undergone considerable erosion, however,
and currently exerts little, if any, influence. At present there are
corresponding due process safeguards afforded an accused in
many areas of military and civilian law2 4
19. Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 996, 304 (1911). Accord, United States
ex rel. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922). See generally Soif, A Com-
parison of Safeguards in Civilian and Military Tribunals, Judge Advocate
J., Bulletin No. 24, March, 1957, p. 5.
20. See generally Walker & Niebank, The Court of Military Appeals--
Its History, Organization and Operation, 6 VAND. L. REv. 228 (1953); Waltz,
The Court of Military Appeals: An Experiment in Judicial Revolution, 45
A.B.A.J. 1185 (1959).
21. United States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 920, 11 C.M.R. 220 (1953)
(right to confront witnesses).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
23. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-5, 18-19, United States v. Culp,
14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 3s C.M.R. 411 (1963).
24. A number of due process rights have been recognized by the Court
of Military Appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Sweeney, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599,
34 C.M.R. 379 (1964) (right to compulsory process); United States v. Schalck,
14 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 34 C.M.R. 151 (1q64) (right to a speedy trial); United
States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.MIR. 244 (1960), overruling United
States v. Sutton, s U.S.C.M.A. 220, 11 C.M.R. 220 (1953) (right to confront
opposing witnesses); United States v. Brown, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 28 C.M.R.
48 (1959) (probable cause necessary for search and seizure); United States
v. Gardner, 9 U.S.C.M.A 48. 25 C.M.R. 310 (1958) (right to competent coun-
sel); United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M_4_. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956) (right
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Despite the fact that military tribunals are not immune from
all constitutional requirements, civilian and military courts re-
main in confusion as to which provisions of the Bill of Rights
are applicable to military courts-martiaL25 The' Supreme Court
has been somewhat inconsistent on this question, as evidenced by
language contained in Burns v. Wilson 6 and Reid v. Covert. 7 In
Burns, the plurality opinion stated that military tribunals have
the same responsibilities as do federal and state courts to protect
to a public trial). See generally the section on military due process in Tunnow,
USCMA DIGaST 841-51 (1959). Some procedural due process rights are ex-
pressly guaranteed in the Code. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964) (UCMJ art.
31) (privilege against self-incrimination). See also Solf, supra note 19 (UCMJ
affords the serviceman a standard of due process at least the equivalent of
that which exists in civilian courts); Quinn, The United States Court of Mili-
tary Appeals and Military Due Process, 35 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 225 (1961); cf.
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.UL. Rv. 181 (1962).
25. The second and third amendment guarantees of the right to bear and
keep arms and the right to refuse the quartering of troops in peacetime consti-
tute clear evidence that the role of the military was a significant consideration
in the drafting of the Bill of Rights. Arguably, since the fifth amendment
right to grand jury indictment or presentment specifically excluded "cases
arising in the land or naval forces," the Founding Fathers might have intended
the general content of the Bill of Rights to apply to the military. Indeed, in
view of the express exclusion contained in the fifth amendment, it is arguable
that the failure to refer to military applications in the other amendments
reflects an intent that they apply to the military. There is, however, a division
of opinion among legal commentators on the question of whether historically
the Founders intended the Bill of Rights to extend to the military. Compare
Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
71 HAzv. L. REv. 293 (1957), with Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of
Rights: The Original Practice (pts. I & H1), 72 HARv. L. Ruv. 1, 266 (1958).
In view of this divergence little if any value may lie in an historical approach
to the question. Moreover the prevailing concept of a "living constitution"
indicates very little should turn on the intent of the Founders even if that
intent could be determined. The important fact is that the Constitution does
not expressly exclude the military from the protection of the right to counsel
guarantee. As Justice Jackson has stated:
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned
had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials
almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret
for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly
speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt
quotations from respected sources on each side of any question. They
largely cancel each other.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (con-
curring opinion).
26. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
27. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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an accused from violation of his constitutional rights. 8 The Reid
Court adopted a more cautious position, saying that "as yet it
has not been clearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and
other protective parts of the Constitution apply to military
trials."29 In contrast, the Court of Military Appeals recently de-
clared that "the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those
which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are
available to members of our armed forces."' 0 However, it was
impossible to ascertain whether right to counsel was impliedly
excluded from the safeguards afforded an accused serviceman
until the recent decision of the Court of Military Appeals in
United States v. Cutp.3 1
Culp, a Marine private, had been charged with larceny and
brought to trial before a special court-martial. At trial the accused
pleaded guilty on the advice of his appointed nonlawyer defense
counsel, and was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, con-
finement at hard labor for four months, forfeiture of a consider-
able portion of pay for four months, and reduction to the lowest
enlisted rank.32 The conviction was then examined by a board of
review. 3 The Board set the conviction aside on the alternative
grounds that prejudicial error had occurred at trial and that, in
view of Gideon, an accused serviceman was entitled under the
sixth amendment to counsel qualified in the law. 4 On appeal to
the Court of Military Appeals the board of review was reversed.
One of the three members of the court, analogizing from the in-
applicability to servicemen of the right to jury trial, argued that
the Bill of Rights was not intended to afford military personnel
rights which they did not enjoy at common law. He concluded
that since servicemen did not have a right to counsel at common
law the sixth amendment did not give them that right.3 5 The
28. 346 U.S. at 14.
29. 354 U.S. at 37.
30. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 420-31, 29 C.M.R. 244,
246-47 (1960).
31. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 .C.M.R. 411 (1963), 63 Arcn. L. REv. 168
(1964), 49 VA. L. REv. 1581 (1963).
32. Id. at 200, 33 C.M.R. at 412.
33. The appellate functions of a board or review are comparable to those
of a federal court of appeals. See generally Currier & Kent, The Boards of
Review of the Ared Services, 6 VAim. L. REv. 241 (1953).
34. United States v. Culp, NCM 63-00442 at 21 (1963).
35. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 204-16, 33 C.M.R. at 416-28. See also Brief for
Appellant, pp. 7-10, United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 3s C.IV.R.
411 (1963), for the Navy's contention that the sixth amendment is by neces-
sary implication inapplicable to the military.
1965]
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concurring judges regarded the sixth amendment as applicable
to servicemen;86 however, they felt that the amendment had
not been violated in Culp because nonlawyer officers satisfied the
right to counsel for purposes of special courts-martial.U7 Signifi-
cantly, however, these concurring judges emphatically expressed
their dissatisfaction with the prospect of continuing this system
of nonprofessional legal representation."8
After Culp, therefore, the sixth amendment is clearly appli-
cable to all military special courts-martial, but nonlawyer officers
may continue to serve as defense counsel. In view of the assump-
tions to the contrary in civil courts89 such a situation seems
anomalous at best. Consequently, an examination of the argu-
ments favoring and opposing the retention of a system of non-
lawyer counsel becomes important.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR RETAINING NONLAWYER
COUNSEL
A. MINOR OFFENSE-MINOR PUNISMMNT
As might be expected, proponents of the present system repre-
sent various branches of the armed forces. The Army maintains
that the legal qualifications of appointive counsel in special and
general courts-martial may appropriately differ because special
courts-martial trials concern "minor offenses involving relatively
minor sentences. '40 However, there is slight difference in the
effect upon a convicted serviceman between many of the sen-
tences imposed in general and special courts-martial. Moreover,
a reduction in rate or a forfeiture of pay imposed by a special
court-martial can be as damaging to a career serviceman's future
promotional opportunities and economic status as many sen-
tences imposed for civilian felony convictions.4 Finally, the
stigma of a punitive discharge imposed by a special court-
martial will adversely affect a discharged serviceman's future
36. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 217, 219, 33 C.M.R. at 428, 480 (concurring opin-
ions).
37. Ibid.
88. Id. at 218-21, 33 C.M.R. at 429-383.
89. See text accompanying notes 7 & 8 supra.
40. Brief for the Army as Amicus Curiae, p. 2., United States v. Culp, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 199, 88 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
41. A serious sentence can easily be imposed by a special court-martial
without adjudging a punitive discharge. For an example of the possible
severity of a reduction in rate, suppose an Army Master Sergeant or a Navy
Chief Petty Officer was sentenced to a reduction in rate to pay grade E-1. His
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employability and reputation. The general public does not dis-
tinguish between the dishonorable discharge of the general
court-martial and the bad-conduct discharge of the special
court-martial.42 The validity of a rationale which classifies a
considerable reduction in rate or a punitive discharge with its
concomitant stigma and forfeiture of certain veterans' benefits
48
as a minor sentence is certainly open to considerable doubt.
Indeed, the Court of Military Appeals has recognized that special
court-martial punitive discharges are harsher than many sen-
tences adjudged in a general court-martial.44 Thus it is particu-
larly important that the damning effects of a punitive discharge
should not be imposed by a special court-martial without afford-
ing an accused the right to be defended by legally trained and
oriented counsel.
It is true that the special court-martial has jurisdiction over
minor offenses which are normally disposed of by summary
courts-martial or Article 15 nonjudicial punishment. It may be
argued that the availability and quality of counsel at trials in-
volving such offenses does not raise a due process question under
the Gideon standard. 45 However, the indelible stigma of any
"court-martial" conviction may warrant the services of a law-
yer.46 Moreover, affording the accused serviceman a right to
professional counsel at all special court-martial trials may give
salary would drop from approximately $350 a month to $150 a month. Thus,
aside from any forfeiture of pay or confinement, he would suffer a financial
penalty of over $2000 in the first year after his reduction in rate. It would
very likely be many years, if ever, before he could regain his former rate.
42. "According to all available evidence the recipient of a discharge under
other than honorable conditions ... encounters considerable difficulty in ob-
taining employment, is restricted from engaging in many types of activities,
and is stigmatized." 109 CONG. REsc. 14146 (1963) (memorandum accompany-
ing S. 2003).
43. For an analysis of the effects of a punitive discharge on the statutory
rights and benefits of ex-service personnel, see Brown, The Results of the
Punitive Discharge, 15 JAG J. 13 (1961).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 333, 32 C2M.R. 333
(1962) (general court-martial sentence of confinement for a period exceeding
6 months held less severe than a bad-conduct discharge).
"Viewed realistically and practically, I doubt that scarcely any punish-
ment is more severe than a punitive discharge." United States v. Kelley, 5
U.S.CMA. 259, 264, 17 CM.R. 259, 264 (1954) (concurring opinion).
45. See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 13.
46. Arguably the possibility of a court-martial conviction itself is enough
to require professional counsel because certain lasting incidentals, e.g., the
humiliation and identification as a criminal resulting from such a conviction,
far exceed the actual penalty imposed. Cf. Teeters, The Loss of Civil Rights
of the Convicted Felon and Their Reinstatement, 52 FPasoN J. 77, 80 (1945).
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the military an impetus to dispose of minor offenses through Article
15 nonjudicial procedures, where they ought to be handled.
B. MmITARY NECESSITY
Many offenses such as desertion, sleeping on watch, dis-
obedience of a superior, and other disciplinary matters which
are tried before courts-martial are of a purely military nature.
Consequently it is sometimes argued that "military discipline"
requires the application of unique procedural rules to courts-
martial.17 There is no doubt that in order to preserve the mili-
tary as an effective instrument of national defense, servicemen
must be deprived of certain substantive freedoms enjoyed in
civilian life.4" Moreover, certain crimes such as larceny or assault,
by weakening military discipline, entail more serious consequences
in the military than civilian life and therefore may call for the
imposition of harsher penalties. Since military regulations are
promulgated to preserve military law and order in the same
manner as civilian laws are enacted to regulate the civilian public,
the existence of different offenses and the imposition of harsher
sentences in the military is justifiable. On the other hand, matters
such as the right to counsel, the right to a speedy trial, the ex-
clusion of coerced confessions, and the confrontation of witnesses
are elements of any fair trial, essential to insure that an accused
is found guilty only of offenses which he has in fact committed.
To require application of these "fair trial" elements of due process
does not interfere with military discipline or the punishment of
uniquely military offenses. 49 The effectiveness of military disci-
pline will depend primarily on morale and leadership rather than
on the structure of the court-martial system. In fact, because
morale is so important in producing effective discipline, guaran-
teeing to every accused the protections of procedural due process
should affect military discipline beneficially"° by increasing the
respect of servicemen for the system of military justice.51
47. Solf, supra note 19, at 6; see Note, 64 CoLum. L. REV. 127, 142-46
(1964).
48. "[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned
to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty .. . ." Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). For example, refusal to perform an em-
ployer's order, disrespect of a superior, or leaving the job would not subject
a person to legal sanctions in civilian life. The opposite, however, is true in the
military.
49. But of. Note, 64 CoLtum. L. REv. 127, 142-46 (1964).
50. Snedeker, supra note 9, at 526.
51. See Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on the Armed Services,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 630 (1949). General Lyman Lemnitzer, former Chairman
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C. AuwroA~c APPEAL
Advocates of the present system have urged that no com-
pelling need for legally-trained counsel exists because military
jurisprudence affords automatic appellate review of all court-
martial trials. 2 However, Gideon expressly recognized that legal
counsel is essential to a fair criminal trial. 3 Notwithstanding the
skill and perception of nonlawyer counsel, he will probably be
unable to comprehend and deal with many of the subtle, but
significant, details that arise during a criminal trial. As a result,
many of those details will fail to appear in the trial record and
therefore be unavailable for review by the appellate court. 4
This automatic appeal argument was expressly considered in
Culp, where the Court of Military Appeals said that compre-
hensive appellate review cannot substitute for the right to
assistance of counsel at trial.5 The Supreme Court has recently
taken a similar position in Douglas v. California."
D. EQUALLY QUALID ANTAGONISTS
The Navy has argued that Gideon should be limited to the
particularly compelling inequities occasioned in that case by
the unfair advantage of the legally-trained prosecuting attorney
over the indigent nonlawyer. 57 It is reasoned that such unfair-
ness cannot exist in special courts-martial because Article 9.7
of the UCMJ provides a "balanced abilities" test whereby the
defense counsel must possess the same degree of legal training
as the trial counsel. Although this balancing standard tends to
eliminate the wide disparity of legal ability present in Gideon,
it would seem that the accused is nevertheless denied a fair trial
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has declared: "I believe that the Army and the
American people can take pride in the positive strides that have been made in
the administration and application of military law under the Uniform Code
of MNilitary Justice. The Army today has achieved the highest state of disci-
pline and good order in its history." (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-101-18,
Oct. 7, 1959). 1960 U. S. COURT OF lmrrARY A1P'rAIs A N. R P. 4.
52. Brief for Appellant, pp. 13-14, Brief for the Army as Amicus Curiae,
pp. 6-8, United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 CW.R. 411 (1963).
53. 372 U.S. at 344.
54. There are "nuances in the heated atmosphere of trial, which cannot
be fully depicted in the cold record on appeal." United States v. Gori, 282
F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1960). See 1963 U. S. COURT OF MMITRY A'PEALS AN.
REP. 2-3.
55. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 218, 33 C.M.R. at 429.
56. 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963).
57. Brief for Appellant, pp. 14-15, United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A.
199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
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under such a system if his nonlawyer counsel is incompetent to
prepare and argue his defense adequately.
E. IMPRACTICALITY
The most valid objection raised against application of the
Gideon standard to the military system of courts-martial rests
upon its alleged impracticality in that context. While all of the
armed services maintain this position, s the Army in particular
has asserted that "there are simply not enough lawyers to go
around."59 Although not mentioned in the opinion, this argument
may have been one reason for the Court's refusal to require
legally-trained counsel in Cuip. Lack of sufficient lawyers to
handle the extra burden of furnishing legally-trained counsel in
all special court-martial trials undoubtedly presents a difficult
problem60 However, the obstacle is not insurmountable. Signifi-
cant steps have already been taken to provide legally-trained
counsel in special courts-martial. Both the Army and the Air
Force have eliminated the use of nonlawyer counsel in any case
where a punitive discharge may be imposed. 1 In fact the Air
Force has afforded such counsel in approximately 99 per cent
58. Brief for Appellant, Brief for the Army as Amicus Curiae, Brief for the
Air Force as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33
C.M.R. 411 (1963).
59. Brief for the Army as Amincus Curiae, p. 4, United States v. Culp, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
60. See Schrader, supra note 13, at 140. The overall manpower problem
which might otherwise arise from requiring the appointment of legal counsel
in all special courts-martial could be somewhat mitigated by taking steps to
reduce the number of nonlegal personnel needed to conduct military trials. For
example, Congress is now considering legislation which would amend the
UCMJ to provide "single-officer courts" in both general and special courts-
martial, S. 2009 (R.R. 10048), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Such tribunals
would be conducted by a single legally-trained officer and, because the pres-
ence of lay court members would not be required, would enable numerous
nonlawyer officers to devote more time to their primary line or staff duties.
A permanent committee including the judges of the Court of Military Appeals
and the Judge Advocate Generals of the various branches of the armed
services has repeatedly recommended approval of the single-officer court. See
1954, 1957, 1961, & 1963 U.S. COURT OF lImiTARY APPEALS ANN. RFP.
Another way to diminish the overall manpower problem would be to
effect a lower percentage of reversals due to error through internal improve-
ments in military justice at the trial level. Such an improvement has been
undertaken by the Navy in its partial use of legally-trained officers as presi-
dents of special court-martial trials. This has resulted not only in a reduction
of reversals, but also in an overall improvement in naval justice. 1963 U.S.
COURT OF MiLITARY APPEALs Axx. REP. 90.
61. Neff, supra note 13, at 63.
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of all its special court-martial proceedings. The Army, however,
with approximately the same number of personnel as the Air
Force, has in one year conducted six to seven times as many
special courts-martial as the latter.65 Possibly an expanded use
of nonjudicial punishment in cases involving relatively minor
offenses, as authorized by Article 15 of the UCMJ, 4 would sig-
nificantly reduce the Army's total number of special courts-
martial.
The Navy has rested its impracticality argument on the
difficulties posed by its far-flung operations at sea. The problem
of affording legally-trained defense counsel to the sailor, how-
ever, may readily be solved by postponing trial for an offense
occurring at sea until the ship arrives at a naval base with an
adequate legal staff!" "Dockside courts" could be established
at these bases to bring shipboard offenders to trial soon after
their ship entered port.60 The inconvenience of delay from the
point of view of the prosecution is negligible since the accused
and any necessary shipmate witnesses cannot disembark while
the ship is underway. Furthermore, ships are not at sea long
enough to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial; in
62. Brief for the Air Force as Amicus Curiae, p. 2, United States v. Culp,
14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
63. See Brief for the Air Force as Amicus Curiae, p. 2, Brief for the
Army as Amicus Curiae, Appendix A, United States v. Culp, supra note 62.
64. See note 13 supra.
65. The naval vessel on which the author of this Note served for three
years had a crew of approximately 300 men. During that period no special
courts-martial were conducted while the ship was at sea. The usual practice
was to await arrival in port; most ports which were entered contained a
naval base with a legal staff. This is the normal practice of ships up to the
size of a destroyer. See Greenberg, The Dockside Court, JAG J., Dec. 1957-
Jan., 1958, p. 19, at 20. Therefore it is difficult to see the "acutely practical
need for the present form of special court" which the Army imputes to the
Navy. Brief for the Army as Amicus Curiae, p. 5, United States v. Culp,
14 U.S.C.M A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
66. Such a system has already been employed by the Atlantic Fleet Mine
Force. Ochstein, The Dockside Court, JAG J. June-July, 1959, p. 13. See
generally Greenberg, supra note 65.
The dockside court .. . is a court set up in various shore installations
who are in the business of trying cases and who would have counsel,
qualified counsel, available so that when the ships come in they
would be able to turn . . . [an accused serviceman] . . . over to this
court, and would ... afford [him] the right of counsel.
SENATE SUBCOMITF ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON THE um cwi Y, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., SuvmizRY REPORT OF
HEARINGS ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNELa 43 (Comm.
Print 1968).
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any event a speedy trial would be of little value to an accused
represented by incompetent counsel. In the case of large task
forces and heavily-manned naval vessels such as aircraft carriers
the problem could be solved by permanently assigning lawyers
to them, thereby allowing special courts-martial to be conducted
while at sea or in any port lacking a legal staff.67
The impracticality argument becomes most persuasive when
applied to the "exigencies of war." It has been asserted that to
require the appointment of legally-trained defense counsel at
every special court-martial would create an overwhelming burden
in wartime due to the larger number of offenses which would
result from increased manpowerf 8 Indeed it has been argued
that combat conditions would cause a breakdown of the entire
UCMJ and a consequent diminution in discipline.0 9 However,
Congress could augment the size of the armed forces' legal corps
during wartime. Effecting an increase in the number of military
lawyers should present no greater problem than making similar
additions to the medical corps, the engineering corps, and other
professional staff bodies which must be significantly enlarged
during wartime mobilization. ° In any event, even if it is un-
feasible to provide legally-trained counsel during wartime, this
does not justify refusal to afford them during peacetime.1 1 The
armed forces cannot be allowed to withhold fundamental rights
from the large number of servicemen in current "cold war"
military forces merely because affording these rights may one
day become impossible.
Ill. ARGUMENTS FOR REQUIRING LEGALLY
TRAINED COUNSEL
Despite the foregoing reasons favoring retention of nonlawyer
67. Ibid.
68. See Brief for the Army as Amicus Curiae, p. 5, United States v.
Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 ACM.R. 411 (1963).
69. See Richardson, A State of War and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 47 A.B.A.J. 792 (1961); SUBCOXMITEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
supra note 66, at 47. Contra, Cobbs, The Uniform Code of Military Justice
in Wartime-Another View, 48 A.B.A.J. 1123 (1962). However, a study
conducted by a navy admiral concluded that the UCMJ worked very well
during the Korean War. SuBcommirTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra.
70. Only ten percent of the 28,000 lawyers serving in the Army during
World War H1 were assigned legal duties. Cobbs, supra note 69, at 1124
n.10. Therefore the availability of manpower with which to increase legal
staffs in wartime does not appear to present a serious problem.
71. See Ervin, The Congressional Study on the Constitutional Rights of
Military Personnel, Judge Advocate J., Bulletin No. 35, June 1963, p. 4, at
11; SuBCOM TTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 47-49.
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counsel, equally if not more persuasive arguments exist for
eliminating them. The foremost of these is that the present sys-
tem inherently affords incompetent counsel and thus constitutes
a per se violation of procedural due process.
The Court of Military Appeals has clearly recognized the
necessity of competent counsel.72 For example, in United States
v. Kraskouskas,73 the court referred to "the constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel . . .- 74 in holding that a non-
lawyer whom the accused requested to be his counsel could not
practice before a general court-martial. And in United States v.
McMahan,79 the court determined that an accused must be
represented by legally-trained counsel during pretrial hearings
incident to a general court-martial. In recognizing the prejudicial
effect to the accused arising from the absence of legally-trained
counsel at such hearings the court stated: "Had a lawyer been
selected to probe into . .. [testimony from witnesses] . . . the de-
fense attorney at the ensuing court-martial trial might well have
been the beneficiary of some material which would have been of
benefit to his client." 76
Although Kraskouskas and McMahan concerned general
courts-martial, the court has been equally zealous in protecting
the accused from inadequate representation in special courts-
martial. In United States v. Gardner,77 a conviction of larceny
was set aside because nonlawyer counsel permitted an accused
to take the stand and give testimony supplying the only inde-
pendent evidence that he committed the crime. And in United
States v. Williams,8 numerous errors such as the admission of
hearsay statements and departures from elementary rules of pro-
cedure, were held to reflect ineffective assistance by counsel. The
Navy has also recognized that an accused has suffered a depriva-
tion of procedural due process if represented by incompetent
counsel.7 9 It seems, therefore, that due process has been denied
72. Since its inception the court has consistently demanded a high
standard of legal competence from defense counsel. 1960 U.S. COURT OF
MAILrrny APPEas ANN. REP. 6.
73. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 26 C.M.R. 387 (1958).
74. Id. at 610, 26 C.M.R. at 390; of. United States v. Home, 9 U.S.CM.A.
601, 26 C.M.R. 381 (1958) (inadequacy of counsel- failure to pursue an
apparently good defense of entrapment).
75. 6 U.S.C.M.A. 709, 21 C.M.R. 31 (1956).
76. Id. at 718, 21 CAM . at 40.
77. 9 U.S.C..A. 48, 25 C..R. 310 (1958).
78. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 398, 24 C.M.R. 138 (1957).
79. Brief for Appellant, p. 19, United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199,
33 C.M.R. 411 (1963). See also Campbell, Speciad Courts-Martial, 18 JAG
J. 299 (1964).
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if defense counsel is incompetent to defend the accused properly.
Although the Court of Military Appeals has not hesitated to
denounce inadequate representation by counsel in special courts-
martial, it has done so only on the facts of each case.80 However,
it is arguable that the high degree of legal competence required
by that court cannot be attained by any nonlawyer defense
counsel in any special court-martial proceeding and that conse-
quently such counsel is per se incompetent.
In Culp the Chief Judge of the Court of Military Appeals
said that nonlawyer counsel were competent to practice before
a special court-martial because "knowledge of the Uniform Code
is required of every officer"81 and because the appointed defense
counsel "must be familiar with all pertinent parts of the Manual
for Courts-Martial wherein the procedural regulations for prac-
tice before all military tribunals are promulgated."'8 But to
attribute such knowledge to the nonlawyer officer is to blind
oneself to the realities of the situation. Reserve officers, who
make up a large part of the junior officer corps and therefore re-
ceive most of the appointments as special courts-martial counsel,
undergo a "cram course" in military justice. In this course, which
is frequently taught by nonlawyers, the officer candidates learn
and retain little useful information. After such limited training
an officer is in no way oriented to the adversarial system of law.P
Indeed, numerous Army commanders at battalion, battle group,
and regimental levels have stated that special court-martial pro-
cedures are too elaborate and technical for nonlawyers s4 Thus,
it is farcical to maintain that a young nonlawyer officer is compe-
tent to conduct the defense of an accused who needs "the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceeding against him."'
80. United States v. Allen, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 504, 507, 25 C.M.R. 8, 11 (1957).
81. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 217, 33 C.M.R. at 429 (concurring opinion).
82. Ibid.
83. "At no time is... [a nonlawyer officer] . . .subjected to the rigorous
and intensive process which fits one to become the advocate of an individual
enmeshed in the toils of the criminal law." United States v. Culp, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 199, 219, 33 CX.MR. 411, 431 (1963) (concurring opinion).
84. 1960 U.S. COURT OF MIIiTARY ApmLEs Aqr. REP. at p. 5 of the
Report of the Judge Advocate General of the Army.
85. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
[T]he obvious truth- with which none can quarrel- is that one
untrained in the law is seriously handicapped by the lack of profes-
sional skill and legal ability which is so necessary in adversary pro-
ceedings, especially involving criminal matters. To the nonlawyer
rules of evidence mean little and instructions are but unimportant
technicalities. To the lawyer, however, they are tools which often-
times spell the difference between success and failure.
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Permitting such a trial has been aptly described as "somewhat
analogous to letting an engineer remove your appendix."88
In addition to his lack of competence, a nonlawyer defense
counsel is usually not given or does not take the necessary time
to prepare an adequate defense. To the nonlawyer officer, a court-
martial assignment represents a collateral duty to his regular line
or staff functions. The very real possibility exists, therefore, that
the attention devoted his legal duties will be quite limited.
Furthermore, the nonlawyer officer is not oriented toward the
adversarial nature of the Anglo-Saxon legal system; consequently
it is difficult for him to understand the ethical obligations of the
legal profession. In some instances he simply lacks the essential
quality of personal objectivity necessary to conduct a proper
trial. For example, if the accused is a disliked incorrigible, the
close-knit operational structure of many military commands may
create an atmosphere in which the offender will be improperly
represented, however well-intentioned his counsel's motives.
Further, the military concept of "command control" may
create pressures on the nonlawyer counsel which prevent him
from doing a satisfactory job. Command control means psycho-
logical pressure and direct influence exerted on defense counsel
or other members of the court-martial by a superior in the mili-
tary chain of command. 7 A nonlawyer officer is more susceptible
United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 610, 26 C:.R. 887, 890
(1958).
The inadequacy of nonlawyer counsel is convincingly pointed out in
an article by a member of one of the military boards of review, who has
observed the numerous errors made by nonlawyers. Neff, Right to Counsel
in Special Courts-Martial, Judge Advocate J., Bulletin No. 34, Oct., 1962,
p. 58 at 62. Due to the existence of such frequent errors, the Navy has
experienced a "high incidence of reversal" of special court-martial pro-
ceedings. 1963 U.S. CouRT OF M iLTARY AppuAxs ANN. REP. 90.
86. Neff, supra note 85, at 63. In Culp the use of nonlawyer counsel has
been similarly described as analogous to allowing "one taking a course in
business law . . .to represent a large corporation in a merger or antitrust
proceedings." 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 219, 33 C.M-R. 411, 431 (1963) (concurring
opinion).
87. The reports of the Court of Military Appeals contain numerous
cases involving command control. See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 9
U.S.C.M.A. 90, 25 CW.R. 352 (1958) (convening authority, the commanding
officer of court members, had a personal interest in alleged offense of
accused); United States v. Deain, 5 U.S.CMA. 44, 17 C.M.R. 44 (1954)
(president of court-martial exerted command influence over junior officers
who were court members); United States v. Knudson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 587,
16 CMA.R. 161 (1954) (illustrates court's distaste for command control
pressures). See generally Camarinos, Command Influence, JAG J., Jan.,
1955, p. 7.
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to "command control" influence than is a legal officer because the
convening authority of the court-martial is frequently his imme-
diate commanding officer and therefore controls his promotional
fitness reports, transfers, and leaves.
Collateral arguments against the present system may also be
advanced. First, the present system discriminates against en-
listed men in favor of officers. As a matter of practice and policy,
military officers are tried only by general courts-martial s8 and
thus are always represented by lawyers. Arguably, such an un-
equal treatment between officers and enlisted men constitutes a
violation of due process of law. Equal justice should apply to
those in the armed forces in the same manner as citizens in
civilian life. The fact that the proportion of military offenses
committed by officers is relatively small is no justification for
affording them preferential judicial treatment. Second, the rela-
tive complexity of pretrial requirements in general courts-
martial"9 has produced a noticeable trend toward the use of special
court-martial proceedings in cases normally tried by general
courts-martial 0 As a result, many of these offenses have been
tried with nonlawyer counsel. It seems plain that such a circum-
vention of due process safeguards should not be permitted to
continue.91
Finally, depriving a citizen of the fundamental constitutional
rights for which he is fighting should not be countenanced except
under the most extreme circumstances ?2 The military community
no longer represents a separate entity in American society, but
an essential element in the fabric of the nation. The armed
forces no longer consist of a hard core of mercenaries living in a
barracks community; instead they are composed of intelligent,
well-trained military personnel who, accompanied by their de-
pendents, live and interact in various communities with civilian
88. Brief for Appellee, p. 11, United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199,
83 CJ.R. 411 (1963).
89. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964) (UCMJ art. 32).
90. 1963 U.S. CouwR oF M iTARY APPEALs ANN. RnP. 89-90.
91. In Kraskouskas the Court of Military Appeals stressed that a
serviceman accused of an offense serious enough to warrant a general court-
martial deserves a trained lawyer. 9 U.S.C.M.A. at 610, 26 C.MJ at 390.
92. Senator Ervin, a ranking member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, has asserted that "no objective could be more important than
to protect the constitutional rights of the men and women in uniform to
whom we have entrusted the defense of country and our Constitution."
Creech, Congress Looks to the Serviceman's Rights, 49 A.B.A.J. 1070, 1071
(1963).
COURTS-MARTIAL
neighbors 3 Since a large percentage of our male population is
currently subjected to military discipline for a considerable
portion of their lives, the protection of their constitutional rights
becomes a significant element in the achievement of "equal
justice under law" for all citizens9 4
IV. COLLATERAL REVIEW OF COURT-MARTIAL
CONVICTIONS
If refusal to appoint legally-trained counsel in special courts-
martial is per se a violation of procedural due process, it may
fall within the collateral review powers of the civilian federal
courts. The scope of habeas corpus review of military convictions
was traditionally limited to questions of jurisdiction2 5 Juris-
diction was strictly interpreted to encompass only considerations
of whether the military tribunal was properly constituted, wheth-
er it had personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, and whether
it had the power to impose a particular sentence." The scope of
jurisdiction was gradually expanded by the lower federal courts
during and shortly after World War II to embrace alleged denials
of due process of law or other fundamental constitutional rights
7
93. See generally Sutherland, The Constitution, The Civilian, and Military
Justice, 35 ST. Jon's L. REv. 215 (1961). "The points of contact between
the civilian community and the Armed Forces are today so numerous and
so intimate that it can truly be said that military life is an . . . integral
part of American life." Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals
and Military Due Process, 35 ST. Jon's L. REv. 225, 254 (1961).
94. The Chief Judge of the Court of Military Appeals has noted that it
is anomalous to afford aliens residing in the country full constitutional
guarantees and at the same time to deprive servicemen of any of those
rights simply because they wear the uniform. Quinn, The United States
Court of Military Appeals and Individual Rights in the Military Service,
35 NoraE DJnru LAw. 491, 493 (1960).
95. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13
(1879); Wurfel, Military Habeas Corpus: 1, 49 Micn. L. Rav. 493, 518-19
(1951).
96. See Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496, 498 (1900); Bishop, Civilian
Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial Convictions,
61 CoLun!. L. REv. 40, 43-44 (1961); Wurfel, Military Habeas Corpus: II,
49 Arcn. L. R v. 699, 713-14 (1951). See generally Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d
887 (1951).
97. See Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 103
(1950); United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.9.d 664 (3d Oir. 1944);
Beets v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 825 (D. Kan. 1948); Bishop, supra note 96, at
45-46. See generally Pasley, The Federal Courts Look at the Court-Martial,
12 U. PirT. L. REv. 7 (1950); Note, Collateral Attack on Courts-Martial in
the Federal Courts, 57 YAim LJ. 483 (1948).
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In particular, incompetence of counsel in military trials became
a proper subject for habeas corpus review if it were found to
produce a denial of due process s However, this trend was seem-
ingly reversed by the Supreme Court in Hiatt v. Brown,99 where
the court-martial record suggested violation of the due process
clause because, inter alia, defense counsel was incompetent and
had afforded the accused only a token defense. The Court held
that the lower federal courts lacked power to review a court-
martial record to determine whether there was compliance with
the due process clause. 00
Notwithstanding the apparent severity of this limitation, the
Court intimated shortly thereafter in Whelchet v. McDonald'
that a denial of due process may present a question for collateral
review.'02 The traditional view that military trials were governed
only by such "due process" as Congress established was still in-
fluential when Hiatt was decided. 13 Consequently, and in light
of Whelchel, the decision of the Supreme Court in Hiatt that an
alleged denial of constitutional due process was not proper sub-
ject matter for habeas corpus proceedings does not necessarily
mean that the same result would be reached if military pro-
ceedings were subjected to constitutional supervision. Thus, as
the Court of Military Appeals began to eliminate the dichotomy
between constitutional and military due process, the Supreme
Court began to broaden the scope of habeas corpus review. In
Burns v. Wilson °4 it was held that, in addition to inquiry into
the traditional elements of jurisdiction, civilian courts might
also consider allegations that an accused in court-martial pro-
ceedings had been deprived of constitutional due process where
it was shown that such allegations had not been given "fair
consideration" by the military courts.305
As a result of Burns, the scope of collateral review of court-
98. See United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944);
Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
99. 839 U.S. 103 (1950).
100. Id. at 110-11.
101. 840 U.S. 122 (1950).
102. See also Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 385, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'
346 U.S. 187 (1953); Kiechel, The Scope of Collateral Review of Court-
Martial Convictions in the Federal Courts, JAG Bull., March-April, 1962,
p. 8 at 4.
103. See discussion in Part I, supra.
104. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
105. Id. at 142-44; cf. Fowler v. Wilkinson, 858 U.S. 588, 585 (1957).
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martial convictions is still somewhat uncertain.1 6 However, it
is arguable that if nonlawyer counsel are per se incompetent, any
special court-martial which employs them before "fair considera-
tion" has been given to their constitutionality lacks jurisdiction
to try the accused and subjects itself to collateral review by the
civilian federal courts. The decision in Culp does not appear to
have given the question "fair consideration" since the opinions
in that case were concerned primarily with the applicability to
military courts of the constitutional right to counsel and with
military regulations rather than with the competence in fact of
nonlawyer counsel. Until a thorough hearing is had on the factual
issues surrounding competence of nonlawyer counsel, they can-
not be said to have been "fairly considered" by the military
court system and the collateral review functions of the federal
courts should not be foreclosed.
One court has recently suggested that any time a court-martial
record compels the conclusion that the accused has been denied
constitutional rights it necessarily follows that the military courts
did not give "fair consideration.'-1 0  This may portend complete
abandonment of the "fair consideration" rule.
CONCLUSION
Rubbing the metal of the UCMJ against the constitutional
touchstone of right to counsel as interpreted in the decisions
through Gideon produces the inescapable conclusion that an
impurity exists. Specifically, the utilization of nonlawyer counsel
in military special courts-martial does not satisfy constitutional
standards of procedural due process; therefore elimination of
this relic of "drumhead justice" should be accomplished as soon
as possible. In effecting this reform three avenues of approach are
available.
First, Congress could modify Article 27 of the UCMJ to re-
quire appointment of legally-trained defense counsel at every
special court-martial proceeding'" - legislation is now pending
106. The area of habeas corpus inquiry has been described as one that
the Supreme Court "has conspicuously failed to resolve." Bishop, supra note
96, at 48.
107. Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1959).
108. The New York County Lawyers Association has gone beyond this
proposal to recommend the complete abolition of special courts-martial,
leaving only (1) nonjudicial punishment under article 15, and (2) one
military tribunal in the form of the present general court-martial proceeding.
SUBCOIAMTTM ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 8upora note 66, at 31.
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which would impose this requirement on peacetime trials where
the accused may be sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge.1 9 This
proposed legislation, however, does not completely answer the
problem of inadequate representation; the nonlawyer special
court-martial would still retain the power to impose a relatively
severe sentence through combinations of other available penal-
ties. 10 Moreover, the realization of a complete legislative solu-
tion is doubtful in view of public apathy toward the m'flitary
community following a long period of peacetime and the absence
of any coordinated effort by lobbying groups to abolish the
present system of nonlawyer counsel. Indeed, the current legis-
lation has been unsuccessfully advocated for many years",
Second, the route of collateral review is open if the uncertain
definition of jurisdiction for habeas corpus inquiry has not pre-
cluded its use to present the question of incompetent counsel to
a civilian federal court. Moreover, if this question were brought
to the Supreme Court as presently constituted, the scope of
civilian judicial inquiry might well be enlarged to include alleged
due process violations or any other constitutional question, to
determine whether the military courts had given "fair considera-
tion" to the issue." 2 Practically speaking however, the remedy
of habeas corpus would be of little value to a convicted service-
man in Private Culp's situation since in most cases he would
have been released from imprisonment before the conviction
could be considered by a federal court," 3 and a writ of habeas
corpus would not restore a reduction in rate or forfeiture in pay
or erase the indelible stigma of a court-martial record.
109. S. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) provides that a bad-conduct
discharge cannot be adjudged by a special court-martial, except in time
of war, unless the accused was represented at trial by a lawyer. The
memorandum accompanying this bill may be found at 111 CONG. REC.
1235-36 (1965). For a short discussion of the bill based on the Congressional
hearings, see SuncomnmrrEE oN CONsTi uToNAL RIGHTS, supra note 66, at
42-45.
110. See text accompanying note 18 supra. For example, disregarding
Private Culp's bad conduct discharge, he still received a relatively harsh
sentence. See text accompanying note 32, supra.
111. In their first and in succeeding annual reports to Congress, the
Court of Military Appeals has recommended such legislation. See 1959
U.S. CouRT OF MiLITARY APPuS ANN'. REP. 34.
112. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 150 (1953) (dissenting opinion);
see also text accompanying note 107, supra.
113. This result would obtain since the maximum confinement imposed
by a special court-martial is six months.
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The most effective and complete solution would be afforded
through reconsideration of the Culp decision by the Court of
Military Appeals in light of earlier cases such as Kraskouskas,
McMahan, Gardner, and Williams. The Culp court, in emphasiz-
ing the requirements of the UCMJ that defense counsel possess
training and orientation in military law, failed to go beyond
these requirements to inquire into the actual facts surrounding
representation of counsel in special courts-martial. A full hearing
on the issue of whether a nonlawyer officer is in fact competent
to protect the due process rights of an accused serviceman must
therefore be conducted before the court's conclusion is justifiable.
This Note has attempted to demonstrate that such a hearing
will prove that nonlawyer counsel are per se incompetent. If this
hearing is undertaken and considerations of military necessity
or impracticality compel continuance of nonlawyer representation
in special courts-martial, the Court of Military Appeals should
explicitly recognize that these are the reasons for depriving mem-
bers of the armed forces of this fundamental safeguard of a fair
trial.
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